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The changes which have been taking place over the past few years in Azerbaijan’s interna-
tional environment and the growing concern about internal stability have led to President 
Ilham Aliyev’s regime to thoroughly revise the country’s security policy by establishing closer 
relations with Russia and opening up to co-operation with Iran. One consequence of this 
move was Azerbaijan’s victory in the so-called Four-Day War in Nagorno-Karabakh in April this 
year – a symbolic success in military terms which nevertheless brought about a real political 
breakthrough. Baku has chosen the political rapprochement with Russia because it has no 
other alternative. Over the past three years, Azerbaijan has revised its risk assessment and 
has reached the conclusion that the West cannot guarantee its security, Turkey’s policy is 
unpredictable, and the strengthening position of its traditional enemy, Iran, generates thre-
ats to Azerbaijan. The rapprochement with Russia is a tactical solution intended at helping 
maintain internal stability and to weather the unfavourable geopolitical, economic and social 
conditions. The co-operation with the Kremlin has brought tangible benefits: a new dynamic 
in the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (beneficial to Azerbaijan); and a strengthening of the 
regime’s stability, which is necessary during a continuing economic slump. In strategic terms, 
closer relations with Russia in fact mean a withdrawal from the previous vision of Azerbaijan’s 
foreign policy based on co-operation with the West and Turkey. The consequences of this turn 
towards Russia will include a further bolstering of the authoritarian regime, restricting Azer-
baijan’s political subjectivity and making it part of the geopolitical bloc being built by Russia 
in the post-Soviet area, for example, as part of the Eurasian Economic Union. The situation in 
Azerbaijan will also depend on the emerging anti-Western Russian-Iranian-Turkish concert of 
powers which Baku may also join.
The exhausted strategy
From 1992, Azerbaijan’s policy was based on co
-operation with Turkey and the West (the EU and 
the USA) while limiting co-operation with Rus-
sia. This strategy has enabled the country to de-
velop independently from the Kremlin. Signs of 
this include: Western firms’ participation in the 
development of oil and gas fields in Azerbaijan 
and the construction of hydrocarbon transport 
routes running through Georgia and Turkey, by-
passing Russia. The effects of this co-operation 
also included Azerbaijan’s income rising; incre-
ased military spending and a strengthening of 
the army; and the enrichment of the clans go-
verning the country. The intense relations with 
the West1 were also expected to strengthen the 
country in dealing with Russia and to contribute 
1 Western states are the main recipients of Azerbaijan’s oil 
and gas; the UK-based firm BP holds the largest stakes in 
Azerbaijan’s most important gas and oil fields (Shah-Deniz 
and Azeri-Chirag-Gunashli) which, in the opinion of 
the then president of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, would 
strengthen state security. Azerbaijan’s troops also partici-
pated in NATO’s missions in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan. 
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to its efforts to regain Nagorno-Karabakh and 
the territories around it which had been lost to 
Armenia in the war in 1991–19942.
At the same time, Azerbaijan continued what was 
branded as ‘strategic’ co-operation with Russia 
so as not to irritate Moscow, which was viewed 
as a potential threat. Since the Kremlin backed 
Armenia in the war over Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Russian-Azerbaijani relations were full of 
distrust and were focused above all on the mu-
tually beneficial supplies of Russian arms and 
employment of Azerbaijani expatriate workers 
in Russia. Relations with Moscow were also 
characterised by the tendency to reduce rather 
than enhance the areas of co-operation, proof 
of which included the closing of the Russian ra-
dar station in Qabali in 2012 and discontinuing 
imports of natural gas from Russia in 2007. 
These assumptions of the state development 
strategy began eroding when it became evi-
dent that the West is weak (the first signal of 
this was the war in Georgia in 2008) and that 
Ankara’s policy is unpredictable3 (after its at-
tempt to normalise relations with Armenia in 
2008–2009). However, it was only in the past 
three years that the main assumptions of fore-
ign policy were seriously revised in connection 
with the changing geopolitical situation around 
2 Azerbaijan pinned its hopes, for example, on the suc-
cessful operation of the OSCE Minsk Group established 
in 1992 in which Western countries predominate (its 
members are: Belarus, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Hol-
land, Sweden, Finland, Azerbaijan and Armenia) and 
which is co-chaired by Russia, France and the USA. 
3 Other manifestations of this policy include support for 
the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring (2011), 
Turkey’s engagement in Syria against Assad, the con-
flict with Kurds (2015) and shooting down the Russian 
bomber (2015). 
the Southern Caucasus and growing pressure 
from Russia, which Azerbaijan would prefer to 
not oppose, choosing instead a policy of forced, 
albeit maximally constructive, co-operation. 
The dangerous reality
Baku’s present policy is affected by both the 
moves being made by its previous partners 
(the West and Turkey) and the growing poten-
tial of the states which are traditionally per-
ceived as a threat (Russia and Iran). 
What the West views as negative changes in 
the global balance of power is reflected in the 
Ukrainian and Syrian conflicts taking place in 
Azerbaijan’s close neighbourhood. From Baku’s 
perspective, the West has failed to show de-
termination in protecting its interests in these 
conflicts, and has even contributed to a further 
destabilisation of the situation. At the same 
time, Azerbaijan fears that EU and US policy in 
the post-Soviet area might provoke a revolution 
or a revolt (as, in Baku’s opinion, was the case 
with Ukraine in 2014, and before that in North 
African countries, which was labelled as the 
Arab Spring) and does not believe that the West 
is willing and able to ensure security and effec-
tive support to its allies (proof of which, from 
Baku’s point of view, was Mikheil Saakashvili’s 
loss of power in Georgia in 2012). The change in 
the socio-political values taking place in the EU 
and the USA (for example, the refugee crisis in 
the EU and the presidential election in the USA) 
may cause a serious internal crisis and a shake 
up of the existing foreign policy priorities – this 
also adds to the negative evaluation.
The actions taken by its ally, Turkey, under Pre-
sident Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s rule have also 
been disadvantageous for Azerbaijan. Baku is 
concerned about Turkey’s policy aimed at esca-
lating further domestic crises (for example, with 
the opposition, Kurds, the movement led by the 
conservative religious leader Fethullah Gulen), 
the tendency to resort to blackmail and provo-
ke conflicts with countries which are also po-
The main assumptions of Azerbaijan’s for-
eign policy were seriously revised in con-
nection with the changing geopolitical situ-
ation around the Southern Caucasus.
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tentially dangerous to Azerbaijan (for example, 
with Russia after shooting down the Russian 
military jet in November 2015) and to make sud-
den U-turns in international alliances (for exam-
ple, the normalisation of relations between 
Ankara and Moscow and the political conflict 
with the EU and the USA). A further aspect hin-
dering dialogue is the fact that Turkey’s gover-
ning party, AKP, and President Erdogan are the 
opposite of the secular regime in Azerbaijan, 
and in fact are building a state which is the 
antithesis of the Kemalist idea of secularism. 
All these factors adversely affect the level of 
trust between Baku and Ankara, and cause con-
cern about the future of the jointly implemen-
ted strategic projects, such as the TANAP gas 
pipeline, which the Turkish minister of foreign 
affairs suggested could be connected with the 
Russian Turkish Stream project after President 
Erdogan’s visit to Moscow (9 August). 
However, Azerbaijan views Russia’s streng-
thening position in the post-Soviet area as 
the greatest threat. This is manifested in the 
Caucasus for example in the growing role played 
by pro-Russian political groupings in Georgia, 
a key country for Azerbaijan’s energy projects. 
Baku also fears the fact that the Kremlin is pre-
pared to launch aggressive operations in other 
countries (Ukraine, Syria) and openly enter into 
conflict with the West (NATO). Azerbaijan’s tra-
ditional enemy, Iran, has been strengthening 
its position on the international arena (and this 
process rapidly gained momentum following 
the partial lifting of sanctions in January 2016) 
and this is equally dangerous to the Azerbaijani 
regime. Even though the Caucasus is not a 
priority direction in Teheran’s policy, the Ira-
nian expansion in this region (for example, the 
projects offered to Armenia and Georgia in the 
energy and transport sector4) does not allow 
Baku to continue its previous isolationist policy, 
and forces it to open up to co-operation. The 
Azerbaijani regime also traditionally fears pos-
sible interference by Iran and Russia with its do-
mestic situation by using radical Shiites or Salafis, 
or ethnic minorities (the Talysh or Lezgian pe-
ople). Russia’s ability to interfere with the po-
litical processes taking place in Azerbaijan also 
causes concern: initially, the opposition’s can-
didate for president in 2013 was a Russian ci-
tizen of ethnic Azerbaijani background5, while 
at present Moscow, at least indirectly, supports 
the idea of holding a referendum on amending 
the constitution to reinforce the position of the 
president in Azerbaijan6.
The country’s domestic policy is influenced by 
the falling oil prices which generate around 90% 
of the income from exports and the continuing 
economic and social crisis provoked in part by 
the decrease in oil prices followed by the 50% 
devaluation of the manat in December 2015 
(this provoked numerous spontaneous protests 
in January this year). Symptoms of struggle for 
financial assets and disloyalty among the politi-
cal elite have also been observed (for example, 
the dismissals of the ministers in charge of com-
munications and national security last autumn). 
4 Iran is interested, for example, in co-operation with Georgia 
in the area of Internet connections (Georgia owns a ca-
ble running along the seabed providing Internet access 
in the Caucasus), gas exports and electricity production. 
From Georgia’s point of view, co-operation with Iran (es-
pecially in the gas sector) will provide a counterweight to 
relations with Azerbaijan (the main gas supplier). In turn, 
Iran and Armenia have struck a deal on increasing gas 
supplies from Iran to Armenia in exchange for increased 
electricity supplies from Armenia to Iran. Iran is also inter-
ested in a railway connection with Armenia, which sees 
this co-operation as an alternative to transport corridors 
running through Georgia. It will also allow it to reduce its 
dependence on Russia. Georgia and Armenia introduced 
a visa-free regime with Iran this year. 
5 The person concerned is Rustam Ibragimbekov, a well-
known scriptwriter and playwright. The formal rea-
son why he was rejected as a candidate by the Central 
Election Commission was the fact that he held double 
citizenship: Russian and Azerbaijani. 
6 http://www.today.az/news/politics/153503.html
Azerbaijan is concerned about Russia gain-
ing strength in the post-Soviet area and Iran 
internationally.
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New calculations 
Given these difficult conditions, the regime in 
Azerbaijan has been focusing on securing po-
wer and its own interests, using a tactic of ad-
justing to the changeable reality and thus mini-
mising the risks to state security and stability. 
The most important tasks for President Aliyev 
include maintaining internal stability, keeping 
the governing clans united and consolidating 
public support. This, in turn, requires an active 
domestic and foreign policy, i.e. a neutralisa-
tion of the potential threats originating from 
these two directions. 
As regards internal issues, the government has 
responded by tightening its grip on society and 
repressing circles which it views as being dan-
gerous (i.e. pro-Western circles, radical Shiites 
raising political and social issues7, and groups 
linked to Fethullah Gulen8, who Ankara has ac-
cused of attempting to stage a military coup), 
getting rid of individuals who pose a potential 
threat to the regime (the tacit agreement allo-
wing radicalised Salafis to leave for Syria). The 
government has also taken provisional action to 
improve public sentiment (for example, lifting 
VAT on bread and flour, and raising pensions) 
and to strengthen its legitimacy both through 
holding events for propaganda purposes (such 
as the Formula 1 race in June this year) and real 
7 The pacifications of the conservative Shia town of 
Nardaran in November and December 2015.
8 Closing the network of schools linked to Gulen in 2014 
following the unsuccessful July coup in Turkey: the 
Caucasus University and Azerbaijan’s first independent 
television channel ANS, which was planning to broad-
cast an interview with Gulen, were closed; http://www.
rferl.org/content/azerbaijan-shuts-tv-station-gulen-in-
terview-turkey/27888826.html
successes in the area of the conflict over Na-
gorno-Karabakh (in the Four-Day War in April). 
As regards international relations, Baku initial-
ly attempted to manoeuvre between the inte-
rests of the individual actors engaged in the 
Southern Caucasus, but in the end it drifted 
towards Russia. When compared to Iran, Tur-
key and the West, the Kremlin began to be 
perceived as a predictable partner interested in 
the stability of the co-operative regime. Rela-
tions have intensified, especially since President 
Vladimir Putin’s visit to Baku in August 2013. 
They cover the economic sphere9, including the 
energy sector (for example, agreements were 
signed on gas imports from Russia in 2015; 
negotiations concerning Azerbaijan’s purcha-
se of up to 5 billion m3 of gas annually from 
Gazprom are underway). As regards social issu-
es, co-operation has been enhanced in the area 
of education (for example, opening a branch 
of the Moscow State Medical University10). 
Azerbaijan also continues buying weapons 
from Russia (in 2015, 85% of weapons impor-
ted by Azerbaijan originated from Russia11). Clo-
ser co-operation with Russia was accompanied 
by increasing pragmatism and the adoption of 
an approach focused solely on deriving maxi-
mum benefit from relations with Turkey and 
the West12, sticking to an anti-Western narra-
tive in line with that of Russia13. Furthermore, 
9 Russia has been the main supplier of goods imported by 
Azerbaijan since 2013. 
10 This is the second time a Russian higher education facil-
ity opened a branch in Azerbaijan. The new branch was 
established instantly, only four months after the decree 
was signed by President Ilham Aliyev. Other examples 
include: the establishment of the Azerbaijani-Russian 
Association of Higher Education Facilities (the memo-
randum was signed in 2015).
11 http://www.eurasianet.org/node/72581
12 The decision not to sign an association agreement in 2014, 
forcing the OSCE mission to leave Baku in 2014, preventing 
the OSCE from observing the election in 2015, getting rid 
of independent media (e.g. RFERL), imposing restrictions 
on NGOs’ co-operation with foreign sponsors. 
13 For example, the anti-Western manifesto by the head of the 
Presidential Administration, Ramiz Mekhdiyev, full of accu-
sations about the West. Azerbaijani politicians (including 
the president)  condemning the EU’s policy on the refugee 
crisis and accusing the West of using double standards. 
The regime in Baku has been focusing on 
securing power, using the tactic of adjust-
ing to the changeable reality and thus mi-
nimising the risks to state stability.
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Azerbaijan is increasingly open to co-operation 
with Iran14 and has positioned itself as a bridge 
between Moscow and Teheran. 
A breakthrough in Nagorno-Karabakh?
The new dynamic, advantageous to Azerba-
ijan, in the area of the conflict over Nagorno
-Karabakh is a consequence of the closer co
-operation with Russia. In addition to that, it 
is also a kind of consummation of this trend. 
During the so-called ‘Four-Day War’ (3–5 April 
2016), Azerbaijan, most likely acting with 
Russia’s consent15, managed to regain mini-
mal strips of territories previously controlled 
by Armenia. This success, while symbolic in 
a territorial sense, was of key significance for 
an Azerbaijan plunged in a political16 and so-
cial17 crisis. It caused widespread euphoria and 
a consolidation of the public around the gover-
nment. It also strengthened President Aliyev’s 
legitimacy, removed the trauma of the defeat 
in the war of 1991–1994, and distracted pu-
blic attention away from the economic slump 
(a 3% drop in GDP year-on-year, and an inflation 
rate reaching 10.6% between January and July).
The escalation in April was nevertheless a lo-
14 Relations with Iran have improved since Hasan Rouhani 
became president. The development of co-operation 
has been manifested in enhancing the legislative base, 
improving the availability of border checkpoints, inten-
sified political dialogue (Aliyev’s two visits to Iran since 
2014, Rouhani’s visit to Baku in August) and joint infra-
structural projects (railroads) which Azerbaijan is ready 
to finance. Azerbaijan’s determination to build a railway 
connection to Iran results from its desire to derail a sim-
ilar project offered by Iran to Armenia. 
15 Indirect proof of this include: the immediate reaction 
from Russia to the resumption of clashes, Moscow’s re-
actions limited to toned down appeals to both parties to 
refrain from using violence, the unexpected publication by 
Russian sources of information on a ceasefire, statements 
from Russian politicians (including Prime Minister Dmitry 
Medvedev) concerning a Russian-Azerbaijani strategic 
partnership immediately after the conflict, the ostenta-
tiously warm atmosphere of the talks with the Russian 
minister of foreign affairs, Sergey Lavrov, in Baku (7 April).
16 For more information, see: http://www.osw.waw.pl/
en/publikacje/analyses/2015-10-28/azerbaijan-a-ma-
jor-purge-ahead-parliamentary-election
17 For more information, see: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/analyses/2016-01-20/azerbaijan-rage-people
gical consequence of the tension which had 
been intensifying over the past few years on 
the frontline, Azerbaijan’s consistent arma-
ment policy (financed by oil exports to the 
West), military reform conducted by the new 
minister Zakir Hasanov (he took the post in 
autumn 2013) and the rhetoric of war used 
by the government continuously for years. 
In the wider context, the Four-Day War marked 
the beginning of the game around Nagorno
-Karabakh which was initiated by Russia and 
better serves the interests of Azerbaijan than 
those of Armenia. From Moscow’s perspecti-
ve, its dominance over Armenia in the areas of 
politics, security and the economy is so strong 
that it can disregard the interests of both the 
Armenian political elites and the public18. Ho-
wever, the Russian initiative for a peaceful reso-
lution to the crisis (the so-called ‘Lavrov Plan’)19 
provoked a sudden and unexpected public re-
sistance among the Armenian public and a po-
litical conflict between Yerevan and Moscow. 
It also led to a crisis between the government 
and the public in Armenia which will be difficult 
to overcome20. 
18 This approach is illustrated perfectly by the fact that, 
during his visit to Moscow in September 2013, President 
Serzh Sargsyan was forced to withdraw from the plan for 
Armenia to sign the association agreement with the EU at 
the Vilnius summit. 
19 The so-called ‘Lavrov Plan’ has never been revealed, but 
it can be assumed on the basis of comments from partici-
pants of the talks publicised by the media that it envisag-
es Armenia handing back the five territories adjacent to 
Nagorno-Karabakh, postponing the issue of determining 
the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the deployment of 
international (in fact dominated by Russia) peacekeeping 
forces. 
20 For more information, see: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/analyses/2016-07-27/threat-chaos-armenia
The Four-Day War marked the begin-
ning of a new game around Nagorno 
-Karabakh. It was initiated by Russia and 
better serves the interests of Azerbaijan 
than those of Armenia.
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Armenia’s stance contrasts with that of Azer-
baijan since the latter is showing off its opti-
mal relations with Russia21, positively evaluates 
Russian efforts and has adopted a wait-and-see 
stance until the negotiations end. Paradoxically, 
Armenia’s unwillingness to accept Russian pro-
posals makes it unnecessary for Azerbaijan to 
articulate its objection against the deployment 
of Russian peacekeeping forces in the conflict 
area, which would be disadvantageous to both 
parties. A solution of this kind would make 
Armenia and Azerbaijan even more dependent 
on Russia, would strengthen Russia against 
Iran (which is launching an expansion in the 
Caucasus) and Turkey, and would also al-
low Moscow to demonstrate its effectiveness 
in conflict management. This would also be 
another stage in the reconstruction of Russia’s 
dominance in the post-Soviet area and in subor-
dinating the Caucasus. 
Whatever the outcome of the negotiations, 
Armenia is clearly on the defensive during the 
talks and is coming under pressure from the 
Kremlin; this situation perfectly suits the regime 
in Baku. Azerbaijan also views the continuing 
crisis in Armenia as an advantage; this is fur-
ther escalated by such factors as Azerbaijan’s 
ostentatiously good relations with Russia. Baku 
may treat the intensification of the domestic 
crisis in Armenia as an opportunity to launch 
an offensive and regain those territories adja-
21 The new quality of relations between Azerbaijan and Rus-
sia is well illustrated by the frequency of mutual visits. 
An Iranian-Azerbaijani-Russian summit on the presiden-
tial level was held in Baku, Azerbaijan’s defence minister, 
Zakir Hasanov visited Moscow, and his Russian counter-
part, Sergey Shoygu paid a return visit to Baku – and all 
this happened during just one week in August (9–16). 
cent to Nagorno-Karabakh which are the sub-
ject of the negotiations using the fait accompli 
method (this scenario will become more appe-
aling should there be an escalation of economic 
problems in Azerbaijan). However, this option 
would require consent from Russia, which wo-
uld use the war to impose the solutions it has 
been pushing both parties far (above all, the 
engagement of Russian peacekeeping forces). 
The current dynamic of the situation is positi-
vely evaluated by Baku; therefore Aliyev’s regi-
me is most likely to adopt a wait-and-see tac-
tic in the coming months until the talks end. 
It will also continue to ostentatiously develop 
relations with Russia in order to put pressure 
on Armenia. 
Possible developments  
– stick with the stronger 
As seen by Azerbaijan, the situation around 
Nagorno-Karabakh remains unstable, and this 
carries the risk of destabilisation provoked by 
external factors. In turn, the dynamics of the 
developments in the country are dangerous 
because there is no chance for an increase in 
oil prices and a positive stimulus to the eco-
nomy. Given this situation, Azerbaijan will try 
to enhance co-operation with the countries 
it perceived until recently as dangerous, abo-
ve all with Russia and to a lesser extent Iran. 
Co-operation with Russia, from the point of 
view of the governing regime, is at present 
the best way to protect itself from the risk of 
a possible domestic destabilisation and from 
Iran’s expansionist policy. In turn, opening up 
to co-operation with both of these countries 
is a way to neutralise the threats posed by the 
Russian-Iranian rapprochement. One example 
of this policy was the unprecedented summit 
of the presidents of Iran and Russia held in Baku 
on President Ilham Aliyev’s initiative22 (on 9 Au-
22 Iran made air bases available in its territory to Russian 
bomber aircraft engaged in the military operation in 
Syria a few days after this meeting. 
The governing regime currently sees 
co-operation with Russia as the best way 
to protect itself from the risk of possible 
domestic destabilisation and from Iran’s 
expansionist policy.
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gust). This tactic adopted by the regime brings 
at least temporary benefits, as proven by the 
dynamics of the talks on the conflict over Na-
gorno-Karabakh, which are now favourable to 
Azerbaijan. 
In turn, co-operation with Turkey covers the 
economic and financial spheres(implementa-
tion of the already initiated projects) ; and this 
is true to an even larger extent with the West 
(access to loans and assistance in the reform 
process). Turkey remains Azerbaijan’s most im-
portant partner but it is losing significance to 
Russia and to a lesser extent to Iran. This means 
in fact a reversal of the previous development 
strategy based on co-operation with the West 
and Turkey. At the same time, Azerbaijan is be-
coming more and more hostage to the deve-
lopment of relations with Russia, Iran, Turkey 
and the West, and its room for political mano-
euvre is shrinking. 
On the regional level, the most serious threats 
to the regime are linked to the conflict over 
Nagorno-Karabakh, i.e. to the risk that Armenia 
may wage a preventive war as a remedy to its 
continuing crisis. It is also possible that Baku has 
made a miscalculation concerning the possibili-
ty of a diplomatic resolution or military victory 
in the conflict. In the geopolitical context, the 
greatest risk is posed by possible tensions in the 
Russia-Iran-Turkey triangle or in the relations 
these countries have with the West, and the 
possibility that Azerbaijan will end up being the 
place where this tension is discharged (as is now 
the case with Syria). In each of these scenarios 
Azerbaijan is more an object than a subject of 
the game, and it will have no other choice than 
to keep manoeuvring and adjusting itself to 
stronger, dangerous players. This offers fewer 
options to President Aliyev’s regime to play on 
the West’s desire to secure its own interests, 
for example in the energy sector, and reduces 
its room for manoeuvre in foreign policy. In 
exchange, the regime gains the possibility to 
maintain political stability at home. The con-
sequences of this policy may include Azerbaijan 
drifting towards the emerging bloc of countries 
at conflict with the West (Russia, Turkey and 
Iran) and concessions in the energy sector (for 
example, as regards the implementation of the 
TANAP gas pipeline). This policy strengthens 
the authoritarian political system, reduces the 
possibility of the modernisation of the state, 
and will in the longer term exacerbate socio
-political problems. 
